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Abstract
User authentication is an important step to protect in-
formation and in this field face biometrics is advantageous.
Face biometrics is natural, easy to use and less human-
invasive. Unfortunately, recent work has revealed that face
biometrics is vulnerable to spoofing attacks using low-tech
equipments. This article assesses how well existing face
anti-spoofing countermeasures can work in a more realistic
condition. Experiments carried out with two freely avail-
able video databases (Replay Attack Database and CASIA
Face Anti-Spoofing Database) show low generalization and
possible database bias in the evaluated countermeasures.
To generalize and deal with the diversity of attacks in a
real world scenario we introduce two strategies that show
promising results.
1. Introduction
Because of its natural and non-intrusive interaction,
identity verification and recognition using facial informa-
tion are among the most active and challenging areas in
computer vision research. Despite the significant progress
of face recognition technology in the recent decades, wide
range of viewpoints, ageing of subjects and complex out-
door lighting are still research challenges. Advances in the
area were extensively reported in [1, 2]. However, checking
if the face presented to a camera is indeed a face from a real
person and not an attempt to deceive (spoof) the system has
mostly been overlooked.
A spoofing attack consists of the use of forged bio-
metric traits to gain illegitimate access to secured re-
sources protected by a biometric authentication system. Re-
cently, the media has documented some situations of at-
tacks in deployed face recognition systems. Using simple
photographs, a research group from University of Hanoi
showed how easy is to spoof the face authentication systems
deployed in Lenovo, Asus and Toshiba Laptops [3]. Since
the release Ice Cream Sandwich, the Android OS come with
a built-in face authentication system to unlock the mobile
phone. Since then, it has been extensively demonstrated
around the web how easy it is to spoof this face recognition
system1. As a consequence, an eye blinking detection has
been introduced in the most recent version of the Android
OS.
The lack of protection against biometric spoofing attacks
is not exclusive to face biometrics. The findings in [4, 5] in-
dicate that fingerprint authentication systems suffer from a
similar weakness. The same shortcomings on iris recog-
nition systems have been diagnosed [6, 7]. The literature
review for spoofing in face recognition systems is presented
in Section 2.
While it is possible to spoof a face authentication sys-
tem using make-up, plastic surgery or forged masks; pho-
tographs and videos are probably the most common threats.
Moreover, due to the increasing popularity of social net-
work websites (facebook, youtube, flickr, instagram and
others), a great deal of multimedia content, specially videos
and photographs, is available on the web that can be used to
spoof a face authentication system. To mitigate vulnerabil-
ities, effective countermeasures against face spoofing must
to be deployed.
It was not until very recently that the problem of spoof-
ing attacks against face biometric systems gained attention
of the research community. This can be attested by the
gradually increasing number of publicly available databases
[8, 9, 10] and the recently organized IJCB 2011 competition
on countermeasures to 2D facial spoofing attacks [11]. This
was the first competition conducted for studying best prac-
tices for non-intrusive spoofing detection.
In recent publications, when a countermeasure is devel-
oped, the new approach is presented and evaluated using
one single database. However the question whether the
countermeasure is really effective in a real world scenario
still remains.
This paper addresses this question in two ways. Firstly
1http://www.itproportal.com/2011/11/14/ice-cream-sandwich-facial-
recognition-cracked/
we present how some countermeasures, reported in the liter-
ature, behave in a experimental setup that emulates a more
realistic scenario. The designed setup consists in train-
ing and tuning countermeasures with one face anti-spoofing
database and testing with another one. Secondly we intro-
duce two approaches to train a face anti-spoofing counter-
measure to improve its effectiveness in the designed setup.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 briefly review the relevant literature. Section 3
describes the architecture of the studied countermeasures.
Section 4 presents the two publicly available databases
which are used in this work. Section 5 discusses the pro-
posed work. The experimental setup and results are dis-
cussed in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 summarizes this
work highlighting its main contributions.
2. Related work
Considering the type of countermeasures for face anti-
spoofing that do not require user collaboration, Chakka et
al. in [11] proposed a classification scheme based on the
following cues:
• Presence of vitality (liveness);
• Differences in motion patterns;
• Differences in image quality assessment.
Presence of vitality or liveness detection consists of the
search of features that only live faces possess. For instance,
Pan et al. in [12] exploited the observation that humans
blink once every 2-4 seconds and proposed an eye blink-
based countermeasure. Experiments carried out with the
ZJU Eye Blink Database2 showed an accuracy of 95.7%.
The countermeasures based on differences in motion pat-
terns rely on the fact that real faces display different motion
behavior compared to a spoof attempt. Kollreider et al. [13]
present a motion based countermeasure that estimates the
correlation between different regions of the face using op-
tical flow field. In this approach, the input is considered a
spoof if the optical flow field on the center of the face and
on the center of the ears present the same direction. The
performance was evaluated using the subset ”Head Rotation
Shot” of the XM2VTS database whose real access were the
videos of this subset and the attacks were generated with
hard copies of those data. Using this database, which was
not made publicly available, an Equal Error Rate (EER) of
0.5% was achieved. Anjos et al. [14] present a motion based
countermeasure measuring the correlation between the face
and the background through simple frame differences. Us-
ing the PRINT ATTACK database, that approach presented
a good discrimination power (HTER equals to 9%).
2http://www.cs.zju.edu.cn/ gpan/database/db blink.html
Countermeasures based on differences in image qual-
ity assessment rely on the presence of artifacts intrinsically
present at the attack media. Such remarkable properties can
be originated from media quality issues or differences in
reflectance properties of the object exposed to the camera.
Li et al. [15] hypothesize that fraudulent photographs have
less high frequency components than real ones. To test this
hypothesis a small database was built with 4 identities con-
taining both real access and printed photo attacks. With this
private database, an accuracy of 100% was achieved. As-
suming that real access images concentrate more informa-
tion in a specific frequency band, Zhang et al. [9] and Tan
et al. [8] used, as countermeasure, a set of Difference of
Gaussian filters (DoG) to select a specific frequency band
to discriminate attacks and non attacks. Evaluations carried
out with the CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing Database (CASIA
FASD) and NUAA Photograph Imposter Database3 showed
an Equal Error Rate of 17% and an accuracy of 86% respec-
tively.
Because of differences in reflectance properties, real
faces very likely present different texture patterns compared
with fake faces. Following that hypothesis, Maatta et al.
[16] and Chingovska et al. [10] explored the power of Lo-
cal Binary Patterns (LBP ) as a countermeasure. Maatta
et al. combined 3 different LBP configurations (LBPu28,2,
LBPu216,2 and LBP
u2
8,1) in a normalized face image and
trained a SVM classifier to discriminate real and fake faces.
Evaluations carried out with NUAA Photograph Impostor
Database [8] showed a good discrimination power (2.9%
in EER). Chingovska et al. analyzed the effectiveness
of LBPu28,1 and a set of extended LBPs [17] in still im-
ages to discriminate real and fake faces. Evaluations car-
ried out with three different databases, the NUAA Pho-
tograph Impostor Database, Replay Attack Database and
CASIA - FASD [9] showed a good discrimination power
with HTER equals to 15.16%, 19.03% and 18.17% re-
spectively.
3. Analyzed Countermeasures
In this paper, we analyze three recently published coun-
termeasures, whose source codes are freely available for
download. Figure 1 shows the basic design of the three
countermeasures.
After gray-scaling each frame, face detection is applied.
The result of the face detection is the input to the coun-
termeasure algorithm which classifies between spoofing at-
tempt and real access. The next subsections presents a brief
description of each evaluated countermeasure.
3http://parnec.nuaa.edu.cn/xtan/data/NUAAImposterDB.html
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Figure 1. Basic block diagram of the three countermeasures
3.1. Correlation with frame differences
The countermeasure proposed in [14]4 measures the rela-
tive motion difference between the face and the background.
The authors focused on simple differences of intensities in
successive frames. The motion accumulated between this
difference (MD), for a given a Region-of-Interest (RoI) and
its respective background, is computed using the following
equation:
MD =
1
SD
∑
(x,y)∈D
|It(D)− It−1(D)| (1)
where D is the RoI, SD is the area of the RoI and It is the
intensity of a pixel.
To input the motion coefficient into a classifier, 5 quanti-
ties are extracted for every window of 20 frames. The quan-
tities are: the minimum of MD in that time window, the
maximum, the average, the standard deviation and the ra-
tio R between the spectral sum for all non-DC components
and DC component itself taken as base the N -point Fourier
transform of the signal (see Equation 2). These 5 quanti-
ties are fed into a Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) classifier
with 5 neurons in the hidden layer which is trained to detect
spoofing attacks.
R =
∑N
i=1 |FFTi|
|FFT0| (2)
3.2. LBP countermeasure
The countermeasure proposed in [10]5 explores the
power of Local Binary Patterns (LBP) in static images. The
detected faces (see Figure 1) are geometric normalized to
64 × 64 pixels. The LBP features are extracted from the
whole face region and histogrammed. The histograms for
each frame are fed into a binary classifier which can be
trained to detect spoofing attacks.
Each element of this countermeasure was extensively
tuned in [10]. The best configuration reported was LBPu28,1
with Support Vector Machines (SVM) using a Radial Basis
Function (RBF) kernel.
4http://pypi.python.org/pypi/antispoofing.motion/
5http://pypi.python.org/pypi/antispoofing.lbp
3.3. LBP-TOP countermeasure
The countermeasure proposed in [18]6 explored the
power of dynamic textures, analyzing motion and texture,
in one single descriptor. For that, an approach based on Lo-
cal Binary Pattern from Three Orthogonal Planes (LBP −
TOP ) was proposed.
The detected faces (see Figure 1) are geometric normal-
ized to 64 × 64 pixels. After that, LBP − TOP features
are extracted from the whole face region and than the his-
tograms for each LBP − TOP plane (XY , XT and Y T )
are computed. The histograms for each frame are fed into
a binary classifier which can be trained to detect spoofing
attacks.
Each element of this countermeasure was exten-
sively tuned in [18] and the proposed experimental
method resulted in the following configuration: LBP −
TOPu28,8,8,1,1,1 with SVM using RBF kernel.
4. Databases
This section presents an overview of the two largest
video face spoofing databases. These databases present a
set of real access attempts and several fake face attacks of
different nature and under varying conditions. To the best
of our knowledge, these databases are the only video face
spoofing databases publicly available.
The Replay Attack Database (Replay)7 [10] consists of
short video (∼10s) recordings of both real-access and attack
attempts to 50 different identities using a laptop. It contains
1200 videos (200 real-access and 1000 attacks) and the at-
tacks were taken in 3 different scenarios with 2 different
illumination and support conditions.
The CASIA FASD8 [9] contains 50 real clients and the
corresponding fake faces are captured with high quality
from the original ones. The variety is achieved by introduc-
ing three imaging qualities (low, normal and high) and three
fake face attacks which include warped photo, cut photo
(eyeblink) and video attacks. The database contains 600
videos (150 real-access and 450 attacks) and the subjects
are divided into subsets for training and testing (240 and
360, respectively).
5. Proposed work
Firstly, we study how the countermeasures, presented in
Section 3, will perform in a more realistic condition. This
condition consists in training and tuning each one of the
countermeasures with one face anti-spoofing database and
testing with another one. To report the performance in such
a scenario, two evaluation protocols were designed to work
6http://pypi.python.org/pypi/antispoofing.lbptop
7http://www.idiap.ch/dataset/replayattack
8http://www.cbsr.ia.ac.cn/english/FaceAntiSpoof%20Databases.asp
with the databases described in Section 4. These protocols
are the ”intra-test” protocol and the ”inter-test” protocol.
The intra-test protocol is equivalent to the database nor-
mal protocol. It consists in training, tuning and testing a
countermeasure with the respectively training set, develop-
ment set and test set of such database. With this protocol,
it is possible to evaluate the performance and the gener-
alization power of a countermeasure within one database.
The inter-test protocol evaluates the countermeasure perfor-
mance in a more realistic scenario, close to real usage con-
ditions. It consists in training and tuning a countermeasure
with the training set and development set of one database
and test it with the test set of another one. With this proto-
col, it is possible to evaluate the performance and the gener-
alization power of a countermeasure in a set of unseen types
of attacks.
The second goal of this work is to provide a way to deal
with data from multiple sources (multiple databases) to im-
prove the generalization power of a countermeasure. We in-
troduce two approaches to achieve this goal. The first one is
to train a countermeasure with a joint training set combining
the train set of multiple databases. The tuning/calibration is
done combining the tune set of multiple databases. The per-
formance of this approach is reported using the test set of
each database to permit the comparison with intra-test and
inter-test experiments.
In the second approach we introduce the Score Level Fu-
sion based Framework. In this framework, each counter-
measure is trained independently with the train set of each
database. Hereafter, the scores of each countermeasure are
merged with a simple sum of normalized scores generating
the framework output. The calibration of this framework is
done combining the development set of multiple databases.
Figure 2 shows the block diagram of the Score Level Fu-
sion based Framework. The performance of this approach
is reported using the test set of each database so it is possi-
ble to compare the results from the intra-test and inter-test
experiments. This technique has the advantage to allow an
aggregative approach: it is possible to add more specialized
countermeasures to one type of attack.
This work was implemented using the free signal-
processing and machine learning toolbox Bob [19] and the
source code of the algorithm is available as an add-on pack-
age to this framework9.
5.1. Evaluation protocol
The Replay Attack Database provides a protocol for ob-
jective evaluation of a given countermeasure. To mitigate
overfitting, such a protocol defines three non-overlapping
partitions: the training, development and test set. The train-
ing set should be used to train the countermeasure, the de-
velopment set is used to tune the countermeasure. The test
9https://pypi.python.org/pypi/antispoofing.crossdatabase
Counter-­‐	  
measure	  
Db	  2	  
Counter-­‐	  
measure	  
Db	  1	  
Counter-­‐	  
measure	  
Db	  n	  
. 
. 
. 
spoof / 
not spoof 
Countermeasure 
training 
Countermeasure 
training 
Countermeasure 
training 
Access 
attempt 
Score 
Score 
Score 
Figure 2. Score Level Fusion based Framework architecture
set must be used only to report results.
The CASIA FASD lacks a specific development set; this
database has only a train and a test set. To mitigate the over-
fitting in this database, the train set was split into five par-
titions and a 5-fold cross-validation training was done. For
that, 4 folds were used for training and 1 fold was used to
tune the countermeasure. With this strategy, both databases
have a train set, a development set (to tune the countermea-
sure) and a test set, so it is possible to merge them.
The performance of each countermeasure, using the test
set of each database, is reported with the Half Total Error
Rate (HTER):
HTER(D2) =
FAR(τ(D1), D2) + FRR(τ(D1), D2)
2
,
(3)
where τ(Dn) is a threshold, Dn is the dataset, FAR is the
False Acceptance Rate in the database D2 and FRR is the
False Rejection Rate in the database D2. In this protocol,
the value of τ(Dn) is estimated on the Equal Error Rate
(EER) using the development set of the databaseD1. In this
Equation, when D1 = D2, we have the intra-test protocol
and when D1 6= D2, we have the inter-test protocol.
Because of 5-fold cross validation procedure, for the
CASIA FASD 5 results were generated. The average of
HTER was provided as a final result.
In order to eliminate the face detector influence, the same
face detector, based on Modified Census Transform (MCT)
features [20], was used for both databases.
6. Experiments
This section provides an in-depth analysis of the results
obtained with the proposed framework. Three experiments
Table 1. HTER(%) of each countermeasure applying the intra-test (D1 = D2) and the inter-test (D1 6= D2) protocol.
Countermeasure Train/Tune Test HTER(%) HTER degradation (test set) betweenEER in D1 D2 dev test D1 = D2 and D1 6= D2
Correlation
Replay Replay 11.66 11.79
309.50%
EER = 11.66% CASIA 47.72 48.28
CASIA Replay 50.23 50.25
65.68%
EER = 26.65% CASIA 26.65 30.33
LBPTOPu28,8,8,1,1,1
Replay Replay 8.17 8.51
620.68%
EER = 8.17% CASIA 60.00 61.33
CASIA Replay 48.97 50.64
113.22%
EER = 21.59% CASIA 21.59 23.75
LBPu28,1
Replay Replay 14.41 15.45
274.75%
EER = 14.41% CASIA 57.32 57.90
CASIA Replay 44.97 47.05
102.89%
EER = 24.63% CASIA 24.63 23.19
were carried out evaluating the performances of the coun-
termeasures using:
1. The intra-test and the inter-test protocol;
2. Combination of multiple databases;
3. Score Level Fusion based Framework.
6.1. Intra-test and inter-test protocol
This experiment analyzes how the three countermeasures
perform using the intra-test and the inter-test protocol. Ta-
ble 1 shows the performance of this experiment following
the stablished protocols. The analysis is supported with the
ROC curves presented in Figure 3.
Analyzing the performance in the intra-test protocol
(D1 = D2), it can be observed a good performance and a
good intra-database generalization power of the three evalu-
ated countermeasures. Note that the countermeasure based
on LBP − TOP is the state-of-art in both databases [18]
and [21]. The good generalization performance can be at-
tested comparing the results between the development set
and the test set. In Table 1 the HTER(%) in the develop-
ment set and the HTER(%) in the test set are very similar.
In Figure 3 the ROC curves blue and red (dashed line and
solid line) represents the intra-test test protocol. It can be
observed that the curves are almost overlapped.
However, analyzing the final performance in the inter-
test protocol (D1 6= D2), the results considerably degrade
compared with the intra-test protocol and it becomes evi-
dent that both databases and the methods are strongly biased
indicating bad generalization power. The average degra-
dation in all countermeasure is ∼ 247%. In Table 1 the
HTER(%) in the development set and the HTER(%) in
the test set are quite different. In Figure 3 the ROC curves
blue and green (dotted line and solid line) represents the
inter-test test protocol. It can be observed that the curves
are quite distant from each other.
The results indicate that the countermeasures and the
databases introduce some bias on the spoofing detections.
The countermeasures bias are possibly related to the feature
selection. The databases bias are possibly related with the
types and styles of attacks that is hard to generalize. In next
experiment, we stray if the countermeasures are truly biased
to databases or can be tuned to overcome the database bias.
6.2. Combination of Multiple Databases
This experiment analyze how the three countermea-
sures perform using a joint training set combining multiple
databases. This is the most intuitive approach to accumulate
attacks from different sources. Table 2 shows the perfor-
mance for each countermeasure trained with this strategy.
Analyzing the performances with this strategy compared
with the performance obtained with the inter-set protocol,
can be observed a significant improvement for all counter-
measures (∼ 41.5% in HTER average improvement). How-
ever, comparing with the intra-test protocol the performance
drops drastically (∼ 62% in HTER average degradation).
It can be observed that the performance for CASIA FASD
degrades more than for the Replay Attack Database sug-
gesting a strong bias for this database. The Replay Attack
Database has twice more data than the CASIA FASD, and
this difference is biasing the final performance.
This strategy also has one drawback: when a new
database with new types of attacks needs to be added, it
is necessary to train and tune all the countermeasures again.
6.3. Score Level Fusion based Framework
To improve the performance results in comparison with
the intra-test protocol and the inter-test protocol and to mit-
igate the bias mentioned in the last section, we introduce a
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Figure 3. ROC curves of each countermeasure using the intra-test and the inter-test protocol. (a) Correlation with frame differences
countermeasure trained and tuned with the Replay Attack Database (b) LBP − TOP countermeasure trained and tuned with the Replay
Attack Database (c) LBP countermeasure trained and tuned with the Replay Attack Database (d) Correlation with frame differences
countermeasure trained and tuned with the CASIA-FASD (e) LBP − TOP countermeasure trained and tuned with the CASIA-FASD (f)
LBP countermeasure trained and tuned with the CASIA-FASD.
Table 2. HTER(%) of each countermeasure trained with Replay Attack Database and CASIA FASD and test it with each test set of each
database.
Countermeasure Test
HTER degradation HTER improvement
HTER(%) (test set) compared (test set) compared
dev test with ”intra-test” protocol with ”inter-test” protocol
Correlation Replay 12.18 24.14 104.75% 48.03%CASIA 43.30 42.76% 10.52%
LBPTOPu28,8,8,1,1,1
Replay 14.29 10.67 25.38% 78.93%CASIA 42.04 77.01% 31.45%
LBPu28,1
Replay 20.45 19.07 23.43% 59.47%CASIA 45.92 98.01% 20.69%
framework based on score level fusion. Using this frame-
work, when a new countermeasure need to be added, it is
possible to ”plug it” without any extra training steps re-
quired for the other countermeasures.
To support this assumption, we first evaluate the level
of independence of the countermeasures trained with dif-
ferent databases in order to ensure its effectiveness in a
possible score fusion. Kulcheva and Whitaker [22] show
that the combination of statistically independent classifiers
is a requirement for a good performance in a score level
fusion. In order to evaluate the dependence of classifiers,
ten statistics were analyzed. The methodology presented on
that work shows that the Q− statistic is most suitable and
we choose that metric to evaluate the statistic dependence
of each countermeasure for the Score Level Fusion based
Framework. The Q− statistic is defined as follow:
QR,C =
N11N00 −N01N10
N11N00 +N01N10
(4)
where R is the countermeasure trained with the Replay At-
tack Database;C is the countermeasure trained with CASIA
FASD; N11 is the number of times that the countermeasure
trained with the Replay Attack Database hits (i.e. correctly
classifies a sample) and the countermeasure trained with the
CASIA FASD also hits; N10 is the number of times that the
countermeasure trained with the Replay Attack Database
hits and the countermeasure trained with the CASIA FASD
misses; N01 is the number of times that the countermea-
sure trained with the Replay Attack Database misses and
the countermeasure trained with the CASIA FASD hits and
N00 is the number of times that the countermeasure trained
with the Replay Attack Database misses and the counter-
measure trained with the CASIA FASD also misses. The
range of this measure goes from -1 to 1.
For statistically independent countermeasures it is ex-
pected a QR,C close to 0. Results close 1 means that both
countermeasures are very similar and there is no improve-
ment in the fusion. Results close -1 indicates that both coun-
termeasures oppose each other and a high degradation in the
fusion should be expected.
Table 3 shows the statistic dependency using the Q −
statistic and the performance in each database trained with
the Score Level Fusion based Framework.
Analyzing theQ−statistic it is possible to observe that
the Correlation with Frame Differences countermeasure is
the most statistically independent and suggests that a score
fusion is suitable. This can be attested analysing its perfor-
mance compared with the inter-test and intra-test protocol
results (see Table 1). For the inter-test protocol the im-
provement with the Score Level Fusion based Framework
was significative (∼ 54% in HTER average improvement).
Comparing with the intra-test protocol the degradation was
very low (∼ 5% in HTER average) and the countermeasure
is able to detect spoofs in both databases with different de-
grees of sucess.
However theQ−statistic for the LBP −TOP and the
LBP countermeasures present unbalanced values for each
database. Specially for the CASIA FASD QR,C ' −0.4
suggesting that each one of this two countermeasure trained
with different databases oppose each other and are not suit-
able for the Score Level Fusion based Framework. This can
be attested analysing their performances compared with the
intra-test protocol results (see Table 1). The degradation is
still high (∼ 102% in HTER(%) average).
The authors that designed the LBP and LBP − TOP
countermeasures chosen the SVM with the RBF kernel as
classifier. In both settings, the final trained machines have∼
35% of the training data as support vectors, which suggest
overfitting in each database. The authors that designed the
Correlation with Frame Differences countermeasure chosen
MLPs with only 5 neurons, which is much simpler classifier
and has less chance to overfit of the training data than a
SVM.
It is important to remark that the literature lacks in video
face spoofing databases and is not possible to ensure the
effectiveness of the Score Level Fusion based Framework
in a third database. Its effectiveness in a third video face
spoofing database, at this stage is only speculative. Another
point to highlight is that the fusion strategy chosen for this
work is quite simple. For a future extensions more complex
fusion strategies need to be addressed.
7. Conclusion and future work
This article demonstrated how countermeasures devel-
oped in the literature perform in a experimental setup that
emulates a real world scenario. For that, we introduced
two test protocols (inter-test and intra-test protocol) using
the only two video face anti-spoofing databases publicly
available (Replay Attack Database and CASIA FASD). The
evaluation of each countermeasure with the intra-test proto-
col, suggests a good performance and good intra-database
generalization power. However in a more realistic scenario
(inter-test protocol) the countermeasures performance de-
grades ∼ 247% in average of HTER(%). This difference
suggests that the countermeasures lacks in generalization
and require some improvement.
We studied two approaches to deal with multiple face
anti-spoofing databases. The first one combines the train set
of each database to train each one of the presented counter-
measures. Compared with the inter-test protocol, this strat-
egy improved the countermeasures performance (∼ 41.5%
in HTER average). However, it was observed a strong
bias to the Replay Attack Database degrading the perfor-
mance in the CASIA FASD. In the second approach, we
introduced the Score Level Fusion based Framework that
merges the scores of countermeasures trained with different
databases. Only countermeasures that are statistically inde-
pendent are suitable for an effective score fusion. Analyz-
ing the Q− statistic measure, the Correlation with Frame
Differences countermesure is the most statistically indepen-
dent and it is the most suitable for the Framework. This was
attested comparing the performance of this countermeasure
with the performance obtained with the inter-test and intra-
test protocols. The HTER average degradation compared
with the intra-test protocol was very low (∼ 5%) and the
HTER average improvement compared with the inter-test
protocol was significative (∼ 54%). However the frame-
work performance using the LBP − TOP and LBP pre-
sented unbalanced values for each database and high abso-
lute values for the Q− statistic. This behaviour indicated
the ”improperness” of fusion for these countermeasures. An
overfitting caused by the SVM classifier in both counter-
measures is a possible reason for this degradation.
As future work we will test more complex strategies of
score fusion in order to improve the performance results.
This Framework is flexible to aggregate not only data from
different databases, but can support any kind of configu-
ration. For example it is possible to aggregate countermea-
sures trained for a specific kind of attack (print attack, video
attack, mobile phone attack and so on). Different configu-
rations for the framework will be tested in the future.
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